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GIVING NEW MEANING TO ‘WATCH WHAT YOU EAT’: AN ARGUMENT FOR FTC REGULATION OF TELEVISION JUNK 
FOOD ADVERTISING TARGETING CHILDREN 
SARA SPENCER NOGGLE1 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, health officials have become increasingly alarmed by the rapid increase  
in obesity among American children.  The American Academy of Pediatrics considers the childhood 
obesity epidemic to be an “unprecedented burden” on children’s health.2  Moreover, because 80% of 
obese children become obese adults, the epidemic has serious consequences for the future of the 
American public health system.  Numerous studies have documented a correlation between television 
advertising and childhood obesity rates (one which goes beyond the fact that children who watch 
television are less likely to have sufficient physical activity to ward off weight gain).3  Indeed, children who 
are exposed to television advertising are more likely to make unhealthy nutritional choices, and to 
influence their parents to do the same.4  Currently, television advertising to children faces little 
governmental regulation and is subject almost exclusively to weak industry self-regulation (which is more 
concerned with self-preservation than self-regulation).  Therefore, the time is right for the FTC to step in to 
regulate television advertising to children, in order to confront this public health plague.  Congress should 
give the FTC the authority and adequate funding to develop and implement, in connection with the 
Department of Health and Human Services, nutrition standards for foods that can be advertised and 
marketed to children and limit advertising for foods that do not meet those standards.  Such governmental 
regulation of commercial speech is constitutional and necessary to protect the health of America’s 
children and economy.5    
I. THE CHILDHOOD OBESITY EPIDEMIC 
In the last thirty years, health officials have become increasingly alarmed by the enormous  
increase in obesity among American children.  According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), since 1980, the proportion of overweight children aged six to eleven has more than 
doubled, and the rate for adolescents has tripled.6  Today, about one in ten two to five year olds and 15% 
of six to nineteen year olds are overweight.7  Including the large numbers of children who are “at risk” of 




becoming overweight, the current percentages double to 20% for children ages two to five, and 30% for 
kids ages six to nineteen.    
 Experts fear that this enormous increase in childhood obesity represents an “unprecedented 
burden” on children’s health.8  Almost 60% of overweight children have at least one cardiovascular risk 
factor such as hypertension.9  Moreover, medical complications common in overweight children also 
include type 2 diabetes, respiratory ailments, orthopedic problems, trouble sleeping, and depression.10  
The Surgeon General has predicted that preventable morbidity and mortality associated with the obesity 
epidemic may exceed those associated with cigarette smoking.11  And considering the fact that an 
estimated 80% of overweight adolescents continue to be obese into adulthood,12 the implications of 
childhood obesity on the nation’s health—and on health care costs—are huge.13     
II. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY 
In an effort to pinpoint the causes of this disturbing trend, experts have pointed to a range of potential 
contributing factors to the rise in childhood obesity that are unrelated to media:  a reduction in physical 
education classes and after-school athletic programs, an increase in the availability of sodas and snacks 
in public schools, the growth in the number of fast-food outlets across the country, the trend toward 
“super-sizing” food portions in restaurants, and the increasing number of highly processed high-calorie 
and high-fat grocery products.14   
 It is only recently that experts have begun to explore the connection between media use 
(television, in particular) and childhood obesity, noting that during the same period in which childhood 
obesity has increased so dramatically, there has also been an explosion in the amount of media targeted 
to children, including television shows and videos, specialized cable networks, video games, computer 
activities, and Internet web sites.15  Children today spend an average of five-and-a-half hours a day using 
the media—more time than they spend doing almost anything else.16  Statistics show that three of these 
hours are spent directly in front of the television.17  Much of the media targeted to children is laden with 
elaborate advertising campaigns, many of which promote foods such as candy, soda, and snacks.  
Indeed, it is estimated that the typical child sees about 40,000 advertisements a year on television 
alone,18 and will see 360,000 television advertisements by the time that she graduates from high school.19    




The first major evidence that children’s media consumption may be related to their body weight 
came in a 1985 article in the journal of Pediatrics, and it was dramatic.  An analysis of data from a large 
national study of more than 13,000 children, the National Health Examination Survey found significant 
associations between the amount of time that children spent watching television and the prevalence of 
obesity.20  The authors concluded that, among 12 to 17 year olds, the prevalence of obesity increased by 
2% for each additional hour of television viewed, even after controlling for other variables such as prior 
obesity, race, and socio-economic status.21  Indeed, according to the authors, “only prior obesity had a 
larger independent effect than television on the prevalence of obesity.”  In a commentary published in 
1993, the authors went on to note that another interpretation of their findings is that “29% of the cases of 
obesity could be prevented by reducing television viewing to 0 to 1 hours per week.”22  
 Since this first pivotal study was published, more studies have found a statistically significant 
relationship between media use and rates of obesity.23  For example, analysis of data from a nationally 
representative survey of more than 700 children ages 10 to 15 years old conducted in the late 1980s 
concluded that “the odds of being overweight were 4.6 times greater for youth watching more than 5 
hours of television per day compared with those watching 0 to 1 hours,” even when controlling for prior 
overweight, maternal overweight, race, and socio-economic status.24  The authors concluded, “[e]stimates 
of attributable risk indicate that more [than] 60% of overweight incidence in this population can be linked 
to excess television viewing time.”25  Similarly, a study based on the CDC’s 1999 Youth Risk Behavior 
Survey, which sampled more than 12,000 high school students nationwide, found that watching television 
more than 2 hours a day was related to being overweight; these findings were consistent for the entire 
student population, controlling for race, ethnicity, and gender.26   
 Researchers, health professionals, and advocates have theorized many ways that media might 
contribute to childhood obesity.  These claims can be grouped into two broad theories:  (1) The time that 
children spend using the media displaces time spent in more physical activities; and (2) The food ads to 
which children are exposed (primarily on television) influence them to make unhealthy food choices.   
A. TIME SPENT IN FRONT OF THE TELEVISION DISPLACES TIME SPENT DOING PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES 
Almost from birth, American children are spending a substantial part of every day of their lives  




using the media—primarily television.27  But the time that children spend using media does not 
necessarily mean a decrease in time spent in physical activities.  Surprisingly, the results of the studies 
that have examined this relationship have been mixed.  Some studies have found a weak but statistically 
significant relationship between hours of television viewing and levels of physical activity,28 while others 
have found no relationship between the two.29  While logic suggests that extensive television viewing is 
part of a more sedentary lifestyle, the evidence for this relationship has been surprisingly weak to date.  In 
order for this to be true, as one study noted, children who watch less television would have to be 
choosing physically vigorous activities instead of television, rather than some other relatively sedentary 
pastime such as reading books, talking on the phone, or playing board games.30   
 Another possibility is that the act of watching television itself actually reduces children’s metabolic 
rate, contributing to weight gain.  One study of 8 to 12 year olds found that television viewing decreased 
metabolic rates even more than resting or sleeping, but several other studies found no such effect.31   
 The fact that most studies have failed to find a substantial relationship between the time that 
children spend watching the television and the time that they spend in physical activity may suggest that 
the nature of television viewing—that is, what children watch on TV—may be as (or more) important then 
the number of hours that they watch. 
B. FOOD ADVERTISING INFLUENCES CHILDREN TO MAKE UNHEALTHY FOOD CHOICES.   
There is growing evidence that the food advertising to which children are exposed through the  
media may contribute to unhealthy food choices and weight gain.  Over the same period in which 
childhood obesity has increased so dramatically, research indicates that the number of advertisements 
that children view has increased as well.  In the late 1970s, researchers estimated that children viewed an 
average of about 20,000 television commercials a year; in the late 1980s, that estimate grew to more than 
30,000 a year.32  As the number of cable channels exploded in the 1990s, opportunities to advertise 
directly to children expanded as well.  The most recent estimates are that children now see an average of 
more than 40,000 television advertisements each year, and will have seen 360,000 commercials by the 
time that they graduate from high school.33    
 The vast majority of advertisements that are targeted to children are for food: primarily candy 
(32% of all children’s ads), cereal (31%), and fast food (9%).34  One study documented approximately 11 




food commercials per hour during children’s Saturday morning television programming, estimating that 
the average child viewer may be exposed to one food commercial every 5 minutes.35  According to 
another study, even the two minutes of daily advertising targeted to students in their classrooms through 
Channel One expose them to fast foods, candy, soft drinks, and snack chips in 7 out of 10 commercial 
breaks.36   
 Most of the studies about children’s consumer behavior have been conducted by marketing 
research firms and have not been made publicly available.37  However, the fact that marketers spend 
billions of dollars each year advertising directly to children provides strong evidence that they believe that 
it works.  For example, fast food outlets alone spend $3 billion every year in television ads targeted to 
children.38  Moreover, recent years have seen the development of marketing firms, newsletters, and ad 
agencies specializing in the children’s market.39  The New York Times has noted that “the courtship of 
children is no surprise, since increasingly that is where the money is,” and added that marketing 
executives estimate that children under 12 spent $35 billion of their own money and influenced $200 
billion in household spending in 2004.40   
 Scientific studies that are available in the public realm indicate that advertising to children is an 
extremely effective way to sell products—especially food.  Studies have demonstrated that from a very 
young age, children influence their parents’ consumer behavior.  For example, several studies have found 
that the amount of time that children had spent watching the television was a significant predictor of how 
often they requested products at the grocery store, and that as many as three out of four requests were 
for products seen in television advertisements.  These studies have also found that children’s 
supermarket requests have a high rate of success in influencing their parents’ purchasing choices.41  
 One study found that among children as young as age 3, the amount of weekly television viewing 
was significantly related to their caloric intake as well as their requests and parent purchases of specific 
foods that they saw advertised on television.42  Another study manipulated advertising shown to 5 to 8 
year olds at summer camp, with some viewing ads for fruit and juice, and others viewing advertisements 
for candy and Kool-Aid.  This study found that children’s food choices were significantly impacted by 
which advertisements the children saw.43  




 Researchers are also beginning to document a link between watching television and children’s 
consumption of fast food and soda, a possible result of exposure to food advertising.  A recent study 
found that students in grades 7 through 12 who frequently ate fast food tended to watch more television 
than other students.44  Another study found that middle-school children who watched more television 
tended to consumer more soft drinks.45   
 Other evidence of television’s potential negative impact on children’s dietary habits indicates a 
negative relationship between watching television and consuming fruits and vegetables.  The USDA’s 
Dietary Guidelines recommend that children eat three to five daily servings of fruits and vegetables, yet 
only 1 in 5 children meet the guideline, and one-quarter of the vegetables consumed are reportedly french 
fries.46  In a recent study, more than 500 middle school students from ethnically diverse backgrounds 
were studied over a 19-month period to determine whether daily television and video viewing predicted 
fruit and vegetable consumption.47  Researchers found that for each additional hour of television viewed 
per day, daily servings of fruit and vegetables decreased among adolescents.48  The researchers who 
conducted the study conclude that this relationship may be a result of television advertising.49  
 The research also suggests that television advertisements may also contribute to children’s 
misconceptions about the relative health benefits of certain foods.  One of the earlier studies found that 
70% of 6 to 8 year olds believed that fast foods were more nutritious than home-cooked foods.50  Another 
study showed a group of 4th and 5th graders a series of paired food items and asked them to choose the 
healthier item from each pair (for example, corn flakes or frosted flakes).51  Children who watched more 
television were more likely to indicate that the less healthy food choice was the healthier one.52   
III. CURRENT CONTROLS OVER ADVERTISING 
Governmental control over advertising in general is vested primarily in the Federal Trade  
Commission (FTC), which is the agency in charge of determining whether advertising is deceptive, false, 
or misleading and to which is delegated the responsibility to take action against the sponsors of such 
material.53  However, children’s advertising guidelines are currently regulated by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), which requires compliance before renewing a station’s license.  The 
FCC does not appear to examine the content of advertisements directed at children; rather, its focus is on 




restricting the time during which commercials can be aimed at children under the age of 12.54  The FCC is 
charged with carrying out the mandates of the Children’s Television Act of 1990.     
 The FCC primarily relies on the advertising industry to self-regulate its marketing activities to 
children.  In fact, the FCC website specifically mentions CARU, the industry regulatory body, as a source 
of redress for complaints.  However, industry self-regulation is weak, ineffectual, and motivated less by 
consumer protection than self-protection.  Thus, meaningful governmental intervention is required in order 
to effectively limit advertising aimed at children.   
A. CHILDREN’S TELEVISION ACT OF 1990 
The Children’s Television Act of 1990 (the Act) encompasses almost all of the law dealing with 
television advertising to children.  However, it is full of loopholes and is even routinely violated by 
advertisers without sanction.  The Act mandates that all broadcasters carry children’s educational or 
instructional programming as a condition for license renewal.55  However, under the current law, stations 
can cite public service announcements (PSAs) or short vignettes as evidence of compliance.56  These 
actions may fulfill the letter of the law; however, they do not fulfill its intent.  Moreover, networks appear to 
be flagrantly violating the law by airing cartoons and claiming them as educational programming.57   
In addition, the Act also limits commercial time during children’s programming to 10.5 minutes per 
hour on weekends and 12 minutes per hour on weekdays (the time is prorated for programs of less than 
an hour in duration).58  The commercial time limits apply exclusively to programming originally produced 
and aired primarily for an audience of children ages 12 and younger.59   
Moreover, the Act directs the FCC to consider whether children’s programs based on toys 
constitute program-length commercials, and thus fall under the Act.60  However, the FCC concluded that 
only those shows that include paid advertising for the toy(s) featured in the program can be classified as 
program-length commercials.61  Thus, even though it is enforcing this aspect of the Act, it appears that it 
is too narrow and should address all program-length commercials.       
B. INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION OF CHILDREN’S ADVERTISING 
Children’s advertising is primarily subject to the self-regulatory policies adopted under the 
Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU).  CARU is a division of the Council of Better Business 
Bureaus (CBBB), the national organization for the 117 Better Business Bureaus in the United States.62  




CARU was created in 1974, and is administered by the CBBB, which funds its operations through direct 
support from advertisers and CBBB membership dues.63  CARU policy is set by the National Advertising 
Review Council (NARC), which is a collaboration between the CBBB and the three major advertising 
associations.64  Generally, CARU reviews advertising in all media directed at children under the age of 
12; to harmonize with the Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, it reviews online privacy practices 
involving children under the age of 13.65     
 CARU’s guidelines66 suggest that advertising should, among other principles, not mislead 
children about the nutritional benefits of products, depict appropriate amounts of a product for the 
situation portrayed, depict food products “with a view toward development of good nutritional practices,” 
refrain from portraying snacks as substitute for meals, and show mealtime products in the context of a 
balanced diet.67  
 Advocates for children’s health argue that industry self-regulation is tantamount to the fox 
guarding the henhouse.  They note that industry policies have not reduced the billions of dollars worth of 
advertising of low-nutrition foods that are directed at children.68  Moreover, industry guidelines are, at 
best, agnostic toward nutrition, when they should have basic nutrition thresholds for foods that are 
appropriate to advertise to children in the first place.69  In addition, CARU does not adequately investigate 
complaints about child-directed advertising:  Often, when complaints are brought, CARU’s eventual 
enforcement actions merely “nibble around the edges of the problem.”70   
IV.  THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENTAL RESTRICTIONS ON FOOD ADVERTISING AIMED AT CHILDREN 
As discussed supra, studies show a strong correlation between childhood obesity and television 
advertising of food to children.  Moreover, current governmental regulations are almost non-existent; 
those that exist are uniformly under-enforced and routinely ignored.  Therefore, there is an urgent need 
for meaningful governmental restrictions on food advertising to children.   
Most experts in the field of child health and nutrition agree that the causes of childhood obesity are  
complex and multidimensional.  Likewise, most agree that effective prevention and treatment demands a 
multifaceted approach.71  But given the fact that children spend so much time with media (especially 
television), some advocates have pointed to media use as one of the most easily modifiable influences on 
overweight and obesity among children.72     




V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT RESTRICTION OF ADVERTISING  
Industry opponents of governmental regulation of advertising aimed at children argue that any more  
meaningful efforts to ban or restrict food advertising than those that presently exist would violate the First 
Amendment rights of the advertisers to spread their messages to the potential consumers of their 
products.73  However, while the Court has recognized that commercial speech is deserving of some First 
Amendment protection, it has left open the possibility that certain restrictions on commercial advertising to 
protect consumers may be constitutional—especially if those consumers are children.    
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITING ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN  
Laws frequently treat children differently from adults.  Children cannot drive, vote, serve in the  
military, or skip school.  Tort, contract, and criminal law all have special rules for children, and assume 
that children will be subject to their parents’ supervision until they reach the age of majority.  The law 
treats children differently from adults because children are not simply miniature versions of adults.  
Rather, children lack the maturity to make the kinds of sound judgments that adults have the capacity—if 
not always the will—to make.   
 In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has presumed that children are 
different from adults, and that these differences justify greater speech regulation.74  In Ginsberg v. New 
York, for instance, the Court, reasoned that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting minors “from 
abuses which might prevent their growth into… well-developed men and citizens.”75  However, in its 
subsequent case law, the Court has proven hesitant to approve of restrictions on speech aimed at 
minors.  Such restrictions must meet the Court’s “strict scrutiny” test for restrictions targeted at the content 
of speech (i.e., such a law must be narrowly tailored to reach a compelling governmental interest).     
While the Court uses strict scrutiny to evaluate restrictions on speech that are designed to protect  
children, it has acknowledged that such restrictions can serve a compelling governmental interest.  
Indeed, some constitutional law scholars argue that the constitutional law regarding children as currently 
construed may permit a “two-tiered” First Amendment—one for adults (with full protection for most 
materials) and one for children (which permits restrictions on material that is harmful to children in an 
effort to help parents to make choices for their children).76  However, in practice, the Court has proven to 
be more likely to find a compelling governmental interest in protecting children from sexually-oriented 




material than from other types of material, such as that which is violent.77  And even when the courts have 
been willing to accept the claim that the physical and psychological well-being of youth is a compelling 
governmental interest, they have appeared to require conclusive empirical evidence that certain material 
is harmful to children.78  This proof is difficult, if not impossible, to come by.   
 Although the Court has been reluctant to treat favorably governmental restrictions on many 
materials to minors, restrictions on advertising are likely to be treated more favorably by the Court.   
Under Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,79 such advertising restrictions will be scrutinized under the less 
strict Central Hudson test for commercial speech.          
B. THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE COURT 
For thirty years, Valentine v. Chrestensen80 provided the controlling rule regarding First Amendment  
protection for commercial speech:  Speech that was commercial in nature was of insufficient public 
interest to justify protection under the First Amendment.  Labeling the double-faced handbill at issue in 
the case mere commercial speech, the Chrestensen Court upheld the application of a city ordinance that 
barred distribution of commercial leaflets on public streets—an ordinance that would have been 
unconstitutional if applied to other types of speech.81  
 However, even as the Court continued to adhere to the decision, cracks in the Court’s 
Chrestensen rationale emerged.  For example, in Breard v. Alexandria,82 the Court rejected the First 
Amendment argument of a magazine salesman who had been convicted of violating a city ordinance that 
prohibited door-to-door sales without consent of the relevant property owners.83  The Court classified the 
magazine salesman’s activity as commercial, and thus not protected by the First Amendment.84  
Nevertheless, the Court conceded that given the public interest content of the magazines being sold, the 
profit motive associated with the sale of the magazines would not have caused the magazines 
themselves to lose First Amendment protection.85  Even though Chrestensen seemed to contemplate a 
separation between speech of public interest and speech connected with profit-making efforts, it had 
begun to appear that these supposed categories of speech were not mutually exclusive.   
 Further chipping away at the Chrestensen decision came in New York Times v. Sullivan,86 the 
landmark defamation decision issued in 1964.  An Alabama police commissioner sued the Times and 
members of an organization whose advertisement, published in the newspaper, allegedly contained false 




statements.  In the advertisement, the organization protested police actions during the civil rights 
movement, and sought monetary contributions to a legal defense fund for Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.87  
Responding to the defendants’ First Amendment arguments, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants’ 
speech should be classified as commercial in nature and hence unprotected under Chrestensen.  In 
arguing for this classification, the plaintiff stressed the context in which the defendants’ statements 
appeared—an advertisement—and the fundraising and profit-making motivations associated with the 
advertisement.  The Court refused to classify the defendants’ speech as commercial, observing that the 
defendants’ statements were in the context of commentary on major public issues and that the 
statements’ content and underlying economic motivations did not strip the statements of First Amendment 
protection.88   
 In Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations Commission,89 the Court echoed Sullivan by observing 
that speech is not rendered commercial by the mere fact that it appears in an advertisement.  The 
Pittsburgh Press Court also appeared to narrow the commercial speech classification by offering a still-
used definition of commercial speech: expression that “d[oes] no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.”90  Ultimately, however, the Court upheld a cease-and-desist order against the newspaper, 
which had published help-wanted advertisements that violated Pittsburgh’s human rights ordinance by 
distinguishing among applicants by gender.91  
 Finally, in 1975, the Court foreshadowed the ultimate demise of Chrestensen.  Bigelow v. 
Virginia92 arose from a Virginia newspaper’s publication of advertisements that noted the legality of 
abortions in New York and mentioned an abortion placement service that interested readers could 
consult.  An editor of the newspaper was convicted of violating a Virginia law that prohibited the sale or 
circulation of any publication that encouraged the obtaining of abortions.93  The Court overturned the 
conviction, employing a rationale that was largely tied to the First Amendment.  Because it stressed that 
the abortion advertisement at issue had gone beyond a mere proposal of a commercial transaction, the 
Court appeared to indicate that the case involved either non-commercial expression or expression that 
should be treated as if it were non-commercial.94   
  One year after the Bigelow decision, the Court finally overruled Chrestensen.  In Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,95 pharmacists challenged a Virginia statute 




that prohibited them from advertising drug prices.  Adopting the Pittsburgh Press definition of commercial 
speech as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction,” the Court noted the 
indispensable nature of commercial speech in a free enterprise system.96  The Court stressed that in the 
marketplace of ideas contemplated by the First Amendment, consumers possess a right to receive 
commercial information that advertisers wish to communicate; this enhances the public interest, the Court 
observed, by “enlighten[ing] public decision-making in a democracy.”97  Commercial speech therefore 
could no longer be seen as unworthy of First Amendment protection. 
 However, despite recognizing the importance of commercial speech, the Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy Court declined to give it the full First Amendment protection extended to political and other 
non-commercial speech.  Rather, the Court instituted what has come to be seen as an intermediate level 
of protection for commercial speech.98  The Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court delineated two major 
features of the less-than-full protection being extended to commercial speech.  First, the Court 
emphasized that there was no First Amendment obstacle to the government’s attempts to regulate false 
or misleading commercial speech.99  In other words, deceptive commercial speech carried no claim to 
First Amendment protection.  Second, the Court noted that no first Amendment protection would attach to 
commercial speech designed to promote an unlawful activity.100       
C. THE MODERN FOUR-PART TEST FOR GOVERNMENTAL RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
For about a decade after its Virginia Board of Pharmacy decision, the Court continued to craft the 
contours of the intermediate level of First Amendment protection for commercial speech.  Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,101 a 1980 decision dealing with a First Amendment 
challenge to a New York agency regulation that barred utilities from advertising to promote the use of 
electricity,102 became the most important of the early commercial speech decisions during the post-
Virginia Board of Pharmacy period.  Recognizing that the regulation restricted a category of expression 
that was entitled to less extensive First Amendment protection than non-commercial speech,103 the Court 
added substance to the intermediate level of protection contemplated by the commercial speech 
decisions of the 1970s.  It did so by setting out the four-part test that has served as the controlling 
analytical framework in commercial speech cases ever since. 
  1.  Commercial speech must not be deceptive and must not promote illegal activity 




The Central Hudson test actually operates as two tests.  The first part determines whether the 
commercial speech affected by a governmental restriction merits First Amendment protection by asking 
whether the affected commercial speech is non-misleading and concerns a lawful activity.104  Drawing 
upon Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court stressed in Central Hudson that the intermediate level of First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech extends only to speech which is not misleading and which 
is designed to promote a lawful activity.105  If the commercial speech either misleads or pertains to illegal 
activity, it fails part one of the test and receives no First Amendment protection.   
 If the relevant commercial speech qualifies for First Amendment protection under part one of the 
test (i.e., if it is not misleading and does not promote an illegal activity), then parts two, three, and four of 
the Central Hudson test become applicable.  Parts two through four serve as a test for whether the 
governmental restriction nevertheless is a valid regulatory action that does not violate the First 
Amendment.106  The intermediate level of protection (the highest protection that commercial speech can 
receive) contemplates that the government may restrict commercial speech in appropriate circumstances 
and through appropriate regulatory means without running afoul of the First Amendment.  Parts two 
through four of the Central Hudson test control the determination of the appropriateness of the 
circumstances and of the regulatory means chosen by the government.  If the government fails to 
establish the requirements of any of the final three parts of the four-part test, the restriction on commercial 
speech violates the First Amendment.107   
2. Government must have a substantial interest in restricting commercial speech 
To satisfy part two of the Central Hudson test, the government must demonstrate the existence of  
a substantial interest to be served by a restriction on commercial speech.108  In reality, this is not a high 
hurdle to reach; virtually any regulatory interest connected with furthering the public welfare appears to 
suffice.109  For example, the Court has found a substantial governmental interest in reducing the social ills 
associated with gambling,110 in reducing the public’s consumption of alcoholic beverages,111 and in 
helping parents maintain control over when and how to expose their children to sensitive subjects.112   
3. Restriction on speech must directly advance governmental interest  
The third part of the Central Hudson test concerns the relationship between the harm that  




underlies the governmental interest, and the means identified by the State to advance that interest.  
Under the third part of the test, the Court requires the proponents of a restrictive regulation to justify the 
relationship between the regulation and the public policy that it serves through studies or empirical data.  
The regulation must have the power to produce the desired effect in meeting its asserted goal. 
 Although the third part of the test has been difficult for the government to prove, the Court has not 
hesitated to find that a restriction on advertising directly advances a government’s stated interest—
especially when that interest is the protection of children.113 For example, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly,114 the Court found ample evidence that a Massachusetts regulation restricting the advertising and 
sales of tobacco products in specific outdoor locations would alleviate the problems of underage use of 
the products.115  The Court found the Attorney General’s evidence that advertising was causally linked to 
tobacco use sufficiently compelling to determine that an advertising restriction would directly advance the 
State’s substantial governmental interest in reducing smoking and tobacco use among minors.116           
4. Restriction on speech must be no more extensive than necessary 
The fourth part of the Central Hudson test examines whether the restriction on commercial  
advertising “is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interest that supports it.”117  To withstand 
the fourth part of the test, the government must prove that the regulation is a good fit with the desired 
objective by demonstrating that less restrictive means are either unavailable, or ineffective to meet 
legislative goals.  The commercial speech restriction is vulnerable under part four if the government could 
adopt alternative regulatory measures that would restrict considerably less expression than the 
commercial speech restriction at issue, but would further the underlying substantial interest just as well.118   
Over time, the fourth part of the Central Hudson test has proven to be the one most often fatal to 
the governmental restriction on advertising.  A restriction on advertising aimed at children is particularly 
problematic, because the same advertising has a protected interest in informing potential adult 
customers.  However, an advertising restriction that is designed to reach only the media that is accessed 
primarily by children might survive the Court’s scrutiny.      
 The leading case concerning restrictions on advertising directed to children is Lorillard 
Tobacco.119 Lorillard concerned a Massachusetts regulation that, among other things, prohibited the 
outdoor advertisement of tobacco products within 1000 feet of a school.120  Although the Court found the 




restrictions unconstitutional, it was because they were too broad of an approach to what the Court 
recognized to be a substantial governmental interest.  The Court agreed that reducing the exposure of 
youth to tobacco advertising would decrease youth smoking, but the billboard bans went too far, because 
they constituted a complete ban on tobacco advertising in some metropolitan areas.121  As for other 
limitations, the Court said, “[t]o the extent that studies have identified particular advertising and promotion 
practices that appeal to youth, tailoring would involve targeting those practices, while permitting 
others.”122  Thus, it appears that governmental restrictions on advertising practices that appeal to youth 
almost exclusively would be justified under the Court’s Central Hudson test.  Moreover, in his 
concurrence, Justice Thomas noted that the federal government might have more power to regulate 
broadcast speech than the state has to regulate print or outdoor advertising because of “special 
justifications.” 123   
VI. THE ROLE OF THE FTC 
 The FTC currently has authority over advertising in general, with the exception of children’s 
advertising—which is presently controlled by the FCC and by industry self-regulation, as described supra.  
However, the FTC is the appropriate agency by which government can institute meaningful regulation of 
commercial advertising to children.  Moreover, the agency has attempted to assert such authority in the 
past (although it’s authority to do so was removed by the Congress before any action could be taken).   
A.  THE FTC’S DECEPTION AND UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY 
 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) prohibits both unfair and deceptive 
acts or practices within or affecting commerce.124   The FTC’s deception standard is set forth in the 
Commission’s Deception Policy Statement.125  In essence, the standard asks whether the challenged 
representation or practice is one that would likely deceive a consumer acting reasonably under the 
circumstances in a material way—that is, in a way that affects the consumer’s conduct or choice 
regarding a product or service.126   In assessing advertising or other marketing practices that affect or are 
directed primarily to a particular audience, the Commission considers the effect of the ad or practice on 
that audience.127  Thus, the FTC’s examination of children’s advertising takes into account the limited 
ability of children to detect exaggerated or untrue statements.128  The FTC has primarily used its authority 




over deceptive marketing to children in cases involving depiction of toys performing acts in commercials 
that do not occur in real life.129    
 The FTC’s current unfairness standard is contained in its “FTC Policy Statement on 
Unfairness.”130  The Commission’s “unfairness” jurisdiction focuses on one primary inquiry: Whether the 
practice causes substantial and unjustified injury to consumers.131  Although the FTC once considered 
whether the conduct in question violates public policy as established by statute, common law, industry 
practice, or otherwise, it no longer takes public policy considerations into account.132  The independent 
nature of the consumer inquiry criterion does not mean that every consumer injury is “unfair.”  Rather, to 
justify a finding of unfairness, the practice must satisfy three tests.  First, the injury must be substantial.  
Second, the potential unfairness must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or 
competition that the practice produces.  And third, there must be an injury that consumers themselves 
could not reasonably have avoided.133    
 First, the injury to consumers must be substantial.  The Commission will not consider any 
theoretical or speculative harms.134  In most cases, a substantial injury has involved monetary harm, as 
when sellers coerce consumers into purchasing unwanted goods or services, or when consumers buy 
defective goods or services on credit but are unable to assert against the creditor claims or defenses 
arising from the transaction.135  However, the FTC has also found that unwarranted health and safety 
risks may also support a finding of unfairness.  For example, in Phillip Morris, Inc.136, the company had 
distributed free razor blades in newspaper advertising in such a way that they could come into the hands 
of small children.  The Commission determined that this posed such a health and safety risk that it was 
essentially an unfair practice. However, emotional harm or other such subjective types of harm will not 
ordinarily make a practice unfair.  For example, the Commission has refused to ban an advertisement 
merely because it offended the taste or social beliefs of some viewers.137    
 Second, the injury must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits 
that the sales practice also produces.138  For example, most business practices entail a mix of economic 
and other costs and benefits for purchasers.  A seller’s failure to present complex technical data on his 
product may lessen a consumer’s ability to choose, but may also reduce the initial price that he or she 




must pay for the article.  The Commission has indicated that it is aware of these trade-offs, and will not 
find that a practice unfairly affects consumers unless it is injurious in its net effects.139 
 Finally, the injury must be one which consumers could not have reasonably avoided.140  The FTC 
has emphasized that the market is largely self-correcting and dictated by consumer choices, and has 
largely relied on consumers to weigh the available alternatives, choose those that are the most desirable, 
and avoid those that are inadequate or unsatisfactory.141  However, the FTC has also recognized that 
certain sales techniques may prevent consumers from effectively making their own decisions, and that 
corrective action may then become necessary.142   Most of the Commission’s unfairness matters are 
brought under these circumstances, “not to second-guess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, 
but rather to halt the sort of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle 
to the exercise of consumer decision-making.”143  Importantly, the FTC has intervened into practices in 
which sellers exerted undue influence over highly susceptible classes of purchasers, as by promoting 
fraudulent “cures” to seriously ill cancer patients,144 noting that this practice unjustifiably hinders the 
patients’ free market decisions.   
B. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE FTC 
The Commission has a variety of tools available to it to attempt to address current harm to 
consumers and to prevent future harm from occurring, including law enforcement action in federal court or 
before an administrative law judge, issuing rules or guidelines, and consumer education.  Court or 
administrative orders sought by the Commission prohibit deceptive or unfair claims and almost always 
impose “fencing-in” relief that covers claims or products beyond those that were the subject of the 
complaint.145  In some cases, the FTC has ordered disclosures to correct or prevent the deception.  In 
rare cases in which the challenged ads substantially contributed to the development and maintenance of 
a false belief that lingers in the minds of a substantial portion of consumers, the FTC has required 
corrective advertising to address the practice.146    
The Commission may also seek redress for consumers or disgorgement in cases involving 
dishonest and fraudulent conduct.  For example, in 1996, a Commission consent order required a toy 
manufacturer to refund to consumers the purchase price of toy vehicles deceptively shown in television 
ads performing such feats as driving and flying under their own power.147  In fact, the toys did not have 




these capabilities and were manipulated with off-screen wires and other hidden devices to make them 
appear to be moving.  As fencing-in relief, the FTC also required the company to send a letter to every 
television station that aired the commercials, advising them of the settlement and of the availability of self-
regulatory guidelines used by many industry members to screen advertising directed to children.148 
Once a Commission order is in effect, violations of the order may result in the imposition of civil 
penalties.  For example, a major toy manufacturer was assessed $280,000 in civil penalties to settle 
charges that it violated an FTC order by misrepresenting that children could use a “Colorblaster” paint 
sprayer toy with little or no effort.149 
C. HISTORY OF THE FTC’S REGULATION OF CHILDREN’S ADVERTISING 
Almost since the emergence of advertising to children on television, advocacy groups have been  
lobbying the FTC to step in to set limits.  In 1968, a new children’s advocacy group, Action for Children’s 
Television (ACT), began to lobby for improvements in both the quality of programming and the amount 
and type of advertising allowed on children’s programs.  In the early 1970’s, ACT filed numerous 
complaints with the FTC protesting specific child-directed advertisements, as well as a 1972 petition 
asking the Commission to prohibit all advertisements for food on children’s television programs.150  This 
petition, which the FTC promptly denied, was followed by a spate of new petitions seeking restrictions to 
curb children’s advertising.   
 In 1977, ACT and the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) each petitioned the FTC for 
a ban on all television advertising to children under eight, as well as advertising for candy and sugared 
food directed to children of all ages.  Those petitions argued that sugar consumption, especially between 
meals, is the primary cause of tooth decay, that tooth decay affects virtually every American, that there 
were an estimated one million unfilled cavities in the United States, and that excessive sugar 
consumption may contribute to more serious health problems, including obesity and heart disease.151  In 
1978, Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. (CU) and Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. 
(CCT) filed a third, more sweeping, petition seeking to ban all television advertising oriented to young 
children, not merely advertising related to sugary foods.152   
 The FTC responded to these petitions by conducting an investigation, and, in February 1978, the 
Staff submitted its report to the Commission, urging it to proceed with rulemaking based on the FTC 




staff’s conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the youngest children could not 
understand the persuasive intent of commercials and that advertising of sugared foods to children of all 
ages may be unfair and deceptive under the FTC Act.153   Significantly, in explaining the Commission’s 
decision to initiate an inquiry, the staff report cited the same concerns about the “vulnerability of children” 
that had led it to promulgate a rule requiring health warnings on cigarette packages.154   The inquiry, 
according to the report, was “a direct outgrowth” of the recognition that “minors constitute an especially 
vulnerable and susceptible class requiring special protection from business practices that would not be 
unlawful if they only involved adults.”155  
 The FTC’s foray into aggressive consumer health protection and its children’s advertising 
restriction (also known as its “Kid Vid” ruling) had not been cut from whole cloth.  Rather, it had its origins 
in the FTC’s Cigarette Rule of 1964, which required the tobacco industry to put health warnings on its 
packages.156  Subsequent U.S. presidents, especially Richard Nixon, had worked actively to revitalize the 
once docile FTC and to turn it toward “initiat[ing] a new era of vigorous action” to protect the consumer.157  
As a result, the FTC had adopted a rather sweeping unfairness standard, beginning with the cigarette 
rule, which had since been cited approvingly by the U.S. Supreme Court.158       
Following the staff’s recommendation to pursue rule-making aimed at limiting advertising to 
children, the FTC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requesting comment on three aspects of a 
potential rule: (1) A ban on all televised advertising for any product when the audience for that advertising 
is composed of a significant proportion of children who are too young to understand the selling purpose of 
advertising (those under the age of 8); (2) a ban on televised advertising for sugared products when the 
audience for that advertising is made up of a significant proportion of older children (ages 8-12) given the 
serious dental risks associated with the consumption of sugared foods; and (3) mandatory health 
disclosures and nutritional messages in advertising for sugared food when the audience is composed of a 
significant proportion of older children.159   
 The Commission also requested comment on numerous factual issues, including whether there 
was any evidence that advertising for sugared foods caused children to consume such products and to 
develop tooth decay.160  Resolution of this factual issue was critical to the FTC’s ability to meet the legal 
standard for finding that conduct was “unfair” under the FTC Act.161  To take any kind of action based on 




unfairness, the Commission recognized that it would have to prove that advertising to children misleads 
them, causes them to purchase unwanted products, or creates an actual or unreasonable risk of injury to 
them (ie, tooth decay).  Whether such “injury” could be avoided, e.g., by parental intervention, would also 
need to be addressed.162        
 In the months that followed the FTC’s proposal, hundreds of written statements were placed on 
the record.  In January and March 1979, several hearings were held.  In July 1979, the FTC concluded 
that adjudicative-type hearings were necessary to resolve specific factual issues regarding the ability of 
children to understand commercials, as well as the health effects of (i) a lack of understanding and (ii) an 
inability to defend against persuasive techniques.163   
 The FTC’s proposed rule stirred considerable controversy among food manufacturers, 
broadcasters, and the press, some of which was highly critical of the FTC—dubbing it the “National 
Nanny,” for its regulatory zeal.164  Responding to industry pressures, before the Commission could adopt 
the proposed rule, Congress stepped in and withdrew its authority to act.  In order to curb the potential 
reach of Section 5 of the FTC Act, Congress enacted the FTC Improvements Act of 1980.165  The 
Improvements Act removed the Commission’s authority to pursue any rulemaking effort based on 
unfairness, which had been the principal legal basis for the proposed rule.  The Act also suspended the 
rulemaking process with respect to children’s advertising and placed a moratorium on the initiation of any 
new rules seeking to regulate commercial advertising as an unfair practice until congressional oversight 
hearings were held on the subject.166  After passage of the Act, the FTC was relegated to using only its 
existing authority over deceptive and unfair marketing practices.167  And because at that time there lacked 
scientific support for the proposition that advertising to children is deceptive and unfair, the FTC was 
forced officially to abandon its proposed rule.  Soon thereafter, the FTC issued its current self-imposed 
guidelines on the use of its unfairness jurisdiction.   
D. THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR THE FTC TO ACT 
At the time of FTC’s proposed rule to limit advertising to children, few people truly understood the  
seriousness of the impending obesity epidemic—consumer advocates pushed for the FTC rule based on 
junk food’s propensity to cause dental cavities, while American public opinion polls demonstrated that the 
public viewed obesity as an almost non-existent issue.  Moreover, extreme pressure from industry groups 




and a lack of understanding about the effect of television advertising on children’s choices also 
contributed to the demise of the FTC’s only effort to restrict advertising to children. 
 During the last two decades, however, the United States has experienced an unprecedented rise 
in its citizens’ body weights.  At the time that the FTC originally proposed its rule, fewer than 47 percent of 
Americans were considered overweight, and under 15 percent were obese.168  Today, it is estimated that 
over 60 percent of Americans are overweight and over 27 percent are obese.169  While adult obesity has 
increased by 80 percent in the last twenty years,170 there has been an equally large growth rate in 
childhood obesity, as discussed supra.         
 As the American obesity epidemic has surged, so have the calls from policymakers, child 
advocates, pediatricians, and many others, to institute policy measures to counter the obesity epidemic.  
Junk food has become a concern to public health experts not only because of its propensity to cause 
dental cavities, but also because of its strong link to childhood obesity.  In light of the rapid increase in 
childhood obesity described supra, food advertisements aimed at children have come under increasing 
scrutiny; more and more, policy experts are advocating for public policy designed to protect children from 
advertising—especially advertisements for unhealthy food.171  For example, in 2003, a coalition of obesity 
experts, health professionals, and child advocates asked Sesame Workshop not to air sponsorship 
messages for McDonald’s before or after its “Sesame Street” program.172   
Policymakers are listening and responding to the growing calls for action.  Recognizing the 
connection between junk food advertising and childhood obesity, in 2003, while on the campaign trail, 
Senator Joseph Lieberman called for a FTC investigation into the marketing practices of companies that 
target unhealthy foods to children.173  Moreover, the California legislature, in 2004, passed a resolution 
calling on the FTC to act to develop and implement nutrition standards for foods and beverages 
advertised to children, and to ensure that equal time is given during television programs that have a 
significant youth audience to encourage fruit and vegetable consumption and physical activity.174  
Similarly, in 2005, Senator Harkin introduced a bill into the United States Senate to restore to the FTC the 
authority to regulate marketing directed at children.175   The legislation, which would have given the FTC 
the power to restrict the advertising of junk food to children under the age of 18, died in the Finance 
committee.176  On November 22, 2005, President Bush signed a bill appropriating funds for the FTC to 




submit a report to Congress by July 1, 2006, on marketing activities and expenditures of the food industry 
targeted toward children and adolescents.177  It was requested by Congress that the report include an 
analysis of commercial advertising time on television, radio, and in print media, in addition to in-store 
marketing and other forms of advertising to children.178         
Several industrialized democracies have adopted policies designed to protect children from 
excessive marketing practices.  Sweden, Norway, and Finland, for example, do not permit commercial 
sponsorship of children’s programs.179  Sweden also does not permit any television advertising directed to 
children under the age of 12.180  Belgium imposes restrictions on commercials five minutes before and 
after as well as during children’s programming.181  The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) decided to 
prohibit the use of its cartoon characters in fast food ads, and England is pushing for stricter guidelines for 
advertising aimed at children.182   
Despite the concerns of public health advocates and experts across the globe, the American 
public has been slow to fully grasp the obesity epidemic in this country.  However, public opinion polls 
demonstrate that American public awareness of the problem is quickly rising.  With this awareness is a 
desire to see policymakers offer solutions to the problem.   
Despite considerable media attention to the obesity epidemic when it first reached the public’s 
radar screen as a public health issue in the early 1990s, no more than about 5 percent of Americans 
during that decade viewed obesity as the country’s most important health problem.183  This left obesity 
behind cancer, heart disease, and HIV/AIDS as the most worrisome threat to health.184  But in the spring 
of 2002, public concern with obesity increased dramatically.185  By 2003, it had become Americans’ 
second most salient health concern, trailing only cancer as a perceived health problem.186  Depending on 
the poll, anywhere from 79 percent to 92 percent of Americans presently consider obesity a serious 
problem.187  Childhood obesity is even more salient a problem to the American public:  92 percent of 
Americans in one poll, and 95 percent in another poll rated childhood obesity a serious problem.188 
Public concern about the obesity epidemic is fueling positive reactions to public policy proposals 
to confront the problem.  Polls show that the American public is solidly in favor of limiting or banning 
outright food advertising directed at children.  Depending on the poll, the percentage of Americans in 
favor of such governmental action range from 57 percent in a 2001 poll to 73 percent in a 2004 poll.189  




While polls indicating support for governmental intervention into the obesity problem seem to be 
antithetical to the common belief (backed by survey data) that Americans believe that obesity is a matter 
of personal choice,190 experts reason that the two competing values of personal autonomy and 
governmental action do not conflict.191  Rather, whether an individual chooses to eat or to be active at any 
particular moment is a personal decision; however, the overall eating and activity of the population are a 
function of an environment that undermines personal control.192  Such public health measures make 
perfect sense under these circumstances.                
Although policymakers and the public in general are both demonstrating willingness for 
government to act to confront the childhood obesity epidemic, as expected, the advertising industry still 
remains steadfastly opposed to governmental restrictions on advertising food to children.193   
VII. CREATING A CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION ON ADVERTISING JUNK FOOD TO CHILDREN 
Now is the time for the government to act to restrict advertising junk food to children, and the 
agency best equipped to deal with instituting limitations on television advertising to children and 
monitoring compliance therewith is the FTC.  Therefore, the Congress should re-authorize the FTC to 
create rules to limit the advertising of junk food to children.  However, absent Congressional 
authorization, the FTC should use its existing authority over deceptive and unfair advertising to control the 
widespread advertising of unhealthy food to children.     
A. CONGRESS SHOULD RE-AUTHORIZE THE FTC TO CREATE RULES LIMITING FOOD ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN.   
As noted supra, there appears to be growing support among policymakers and the general public  
for federal intervention to restrict the marketing of unhealthy foods to children.194  Indeed, as discussed 
supra, legislation has recently been introduced to re-authorize the FTC to create rules limiting such 
advertising.  Now is the time for the Congress to pass legislation that reinstates the FTC’s rulemaking 
authority over the marketing of food to children.        
B. THE FTC CAN USE ITS EXISTING AUTHORITY TO LIMIT THE MARKETING OF UNHEALTHY FOOD TO CHILDREN. 
Absent a Congressional reauthorization of its rule-making authority, the FTC already has the 
authority to regulate advertising that is deceptive and unfair, as those features of its authority were not 
stripped away by Congress during its first attempt at rulemaking in this area.  Moreover, the First 
Amendment does not apply at all to advertising that is deceptive.  Thus, the optimal means by which 




government can regulate television advertising to children is by the FTC asserting its current authority 
over deceptive and unfair advertising to commercials aimed at children.  Because experts such as the 
American Academy of Pediatrics argue that all advertising aimed at children under the age of 8 years old 
is inherently deceptive, the FTC can rationally utilize its authority over such advertising and greatly restrict 
it—if not ban it all together.  
In the alternative, or for advertising aimed at children over the age of 8, the FTC can assert 
authority over television advertising to children under its “unfairness” jurisdiction.  Advertising to children 
as “unfair” is not a new proposition—experts on children’s health and policy have been making this 
argument for decades.  In order for a governmental restriction on commercial advertising to children 
based on the FTC’s unfairness jurisdiction to be constitutional, it must meet the requirements of the 
Central Hudson four-part test as discussed supra.          
1. Advertising to children as “deceptive” advertising 
As discussed supra, the FTC’s deception standard asks whether the challenged representation or 
practice is one that would likely deceive a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances in a 
material way—that is, in a way that affects the consumer’s conduct or choice regarding a product or 
service.195   In assessing advertising or other marketing practices that affect or are directed primarily to a 
particular audience, the Commission considers the effect of the ad or practice on that audience.196  Thus, 
the FTC’s examination of children’s advertising takes into account the limited ability of children to detect 
exaggerated or untrue statements.197   
Advertising to children—especially children under the age of 8 years old—is inherently deceptive.  
In fact, the three major marketing associations recognize that material that might be truthful and non-
deceptive to adults might still mislead children.198  There have been numerous studies documenting that 
young children under 8 years of age developmentally are unable to understand the intent of 
advertisements and, in fact, accept advertising claims as true.  Indeed, experts reason that the youngest 
viewers, up to age 8, cannot distinguish advertising from regular television programming.199   
In order to persuade children to consume their company’s products, marketers link feelings and 
perceptions to products—especially linkages to feelings of comfort, love, and family.200  The combination 
of children’s innocence and inability to distinguish advertising from reality leads to extreme manipulation 




of their behaviors and desires by commercial television.  Studies indicate that the more that children 
watch television, the more they specifically request brand name products at the grocery store.201  In fact, 
children can recognize images of corporate logos and mascots from as young as six months old.202   
Marketing to children thus deprives them of their autonomy as individuals—robbing them of the 
ability to make choices (or to learn to make choices) based on their individual preferences, and not the 
desires of corporations seeking to incorporate them into the consumer culture as mindless purchasers of 
their products.  Therefore, advertising to children under the age of 8 meets the FTC’s standard for 
deceptive advertising; the agency is therefore empowered to greatly restrict it, or even ban it altogether, 
without prior Congressional approval or First Amendment consequences.      
2. Advertising to children as “unfair” trade practice 
As discussed supra, the FTC’s “unfairness” jurisdiction focuses on one primary inquiry: Whether 
the practice causes substantial and unjustified injury to consumers.203  To justify a finding of unfairness, 
the practice must satisfy three tests.  First, the injury must be substantial.  Second, the potential 
unfairness must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the 
practice produces.  And third, there must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably 
have avoided.204  Because advertising to children meets the FTC’s standard for unfair marketing 
practices, and is also constitutional under the Court’s Central Hudson standard, the FTC should take 
action to regulate commercial advertising aimed at children.   
i. Advertising junk food to children causes substantial injury 
Many researchers strongly suspect that the food advertising to which children are exposed 
through the media may contribute to unhealthy food choices and weight gain.  As discussed supra, over 
the same period in which childhood obesity has increased so dramatically, research indicates that the 
number of advertisements that children view has increased as well.  The most recent estimates are that 
children now see an average of more than 40,000 television advertisements each year, and will have 
seen 360,000 commercials by the time that they graduate from high school.205    
Studies show that advertising to children shapes their nutritional choices, and because most of 
the advertising that is aimed at children is for unhealthy foods, children naturally choose those foods over 
other, more healthy, alternatives.  Moreover, advertising aimed at children negatively influences their 




perceptions about the relative health benefits of foods.  Children who are exposed to advertising on 
television are more likely to believe that certain foods (especially fast foods) are nutritious, when in fact 
they clearly are not.  In addition, children who view commercial advertisements are more likely to request 
that their parents purchase the advertised product at the grocery store—thereby influencing the nutritional 
choices of their entire families. 
   The injury caused by childhood obesity is undeniably substantial.  As discussed supra, the 
increase in childhood obesity represents an “unprecedented burden” on children’s health.206  The 
Surgeon General has predicted that preventable morbidity and mortality associated with obesity may 
exceed those associated with cigarette smoking.207  Considering the fact that an estimated 80% of 
overweight adolescents continue to be obese in adulthood,208 the implications of childhood obesity on the 
nation’s health—and on health care costs—are huge.209  This trend seriously compromises the future 
health and productivity of the U.S. population.  Moreover, obesity-related health care costs threaten the 
prospect of a recovery for the American economy; the American Academy of Pediatrics has called the 
potential costs associated with childhood obesity “staggering.”210   
ii. Unfairness not outweighed by benefits to consumers 
While advertising to adults has the potential benefit of educating them about choices among  
products in quality and price, advertising to children has no such benefit.  This informational failure occurs 
because, as discussed supra, children are unable to distinguish between advertising and programming, 
and are also unable to differentiate between products in terms of nutritional value.  Moreover, children’s 
limited world view forces them to misinterpret the information that they receive. 
 Advertising pushes children to make what economists call “inefficient” purchasing choices.211  
Even if children fully understood advertising for what it is (which they do not), they still have a limited 
knowledge base and mental construct of the world, compared to adults.  An advertisement promotes only 
a limited piece of the whole picture—that which is most favorable to the advertiser.212  This bias leaves 
children with only a small amount of information.  Adults, who have more experience and knowledge, 
would be able to fit the information from the advertisement into their mental construct of the world, 
treating it as just another bit of information.  But for children, the advertisement is a much larger 
percentage of their total knowledge.213  Thus, the small amount of information that the commercial 




imparts, because of children’s limited knowledge and experience in the world, has the potential to create 
a bigger impact on children’s choices than on those of adults.  Therefore, the informational benefit of 
advertising to children is far outweighed by the misperception about the world that the advertising 
conveys.             
iii. Injury is not one that consumers could reasonably have avoided 
As discussed supra, television advertising has a significant impact on children’s nutritional  
choices.  Commercials make children want foods that, in the long run, will do more harm to them than 
good.  However, while children have a good deal of disposable income (cite), statistics show that parents 
and guardians purchase most of the food that children consume (cite).  Therefore, in theory, the injury to 
children (childhood obesity) could reasonably be avoided by parental intervention in the form of not 
purchasing the children’s desired products.  In reality, though, parents act more as “amplifiers” of the 
advertising problem than as “buffers” from it.   
 There are two views of the family dynamic in the economic literature.214  The first view sees the 
family serving as a buffer to prevent the ill-informed member (the child who receives information on 
nutrition through television advertising) from causing damage to the family by acting on the 
misinformation.215  Upon learning of the misinformation, the family could provide the child with better 
information or deny the child access to family resources (by not purchasing the product at the grocery 
store).216  Either choice could serve to limit the number or importance of the decisions made by the 
misinformed member (the child influenced by television advertising).  This scenario, according to 
economists, is more likely to play out in a setting where the misinformation is expected and family 
members have the time to discover and adjust to it accordingly.217  
 The second view sees the family serving as an amplifier, allowing greater misinformation effects 
than if the child had not been present.218  This scenario is more likely to exist when the purchasing power 
of the family as a whole is much greater than that of the child, when the other family members are unable 
to properly educate the child with good information, or where the family members choose to act upon the 
misinformation either through a lack of knowledge or a sense of appeasement of the child.219  The 
willingness to appease children has been termed the “nag factor” by advertisers.220  In fact, the purpose of 
most advertising to children is to push families to become amplifiers by creating naggers out of the 




children.221  The effect is to undermine the ability of parents to control their children and to teach a 
preference for foods that provide better nutritional value.222  Therefore, rather than helping their children 
to avoid the injury brought on by television advertising, parents tend to amplify the problem by appeasing 
their children and purchasing the unhealthy products.  Regardless of who is to blame, the responsibility 
does not fall upon the children most affected by the problem and who could not reasonably have avoided 
the injury.  
C. FTC ACTION MUST MEET THE CENTRAL HUDSON FOUR-PART TEST   
 FTC action to restrict the marketing of food to children using its “unfairness” jurisdiction must still 
meet the requirements of the Court’s Central Hudson test for regulations that restrict commercial speech.  
If the advertising is not misleading, the government must prove that it has a substantial interest in 
restricting the speech.  Moreover, the restriction must directly advance the governmental interest at issue.  
Lastly, the restriction must be a good fit with the government’s interest.  As will be discussed infra, an 
FTC rule that restricts the advertising of junk food to children likely meets the requirements of this test.     
1. Advertising is not misleading and government has substantial interest 
Although experts reason that advertising aimed at children under the age of 8 is inherently  
deceptive, as discussed supra, there is not a widespread agreement that advertising to older children is 
similarly misleading.  Therefore, in order for FTC action that restricts food advertising to children to be 
constitutional under the Central Hudson test, the government must demonstrate the existence of a 
substantial interest to be served by such a restriction on commercial speech.223  Under the current case 
law, this is not a high hurdle to reach; virtually any regulatory interest connected with furthering the public 
welfare appears to suffice.224  For example, the Court has found a substantial governmental interest in 
reducing the social ills associated with gambling,225 in reducing the public’s consumption of alcoholic 
beverages,226 and in helping parents maintain control over when and how to expose their children to 
sensitive subjects.227  Given the numerous studies that have demonstrated a correlation between 
childhood obesity and the advertising of junk food to children, an FTC rule controlling the matter should 
easily meet this test.   
2. Restriction directly advances governmental interest 
The next part of the Central Hudson test concerns the relationship between the harm that  




underlies the governmental interest, and the means identified by the State to advance that interest.  
Under the third prong of the test, the Court requires the proponents of a restrictive regulation to justify the 
relationship between the regulation and the public policy that it serves through studies or empirical data.  
The regulation must have the power to produce the desired effect in meeting its asserted goal. 
 Although this part of the test has been difficult for the government to meet, the Court has not 
hesitated to find that a restriction on advertising directly advances a government’s stated interest—
especially when that interest is the protection of children.228 For example, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly,229 the Court found ample evidence that a Massachusetts regulation restricting the advertising and 
sales of tobacco products in specific outdoor locations would alleviate the problems of underage use of 
the products.230  The Court found the Attorney General’s evidence that advertising was causally linked to 
tobacco use sufficiently compelling to determine that an advertising restriction would directly advance the 
State’s substantial governmental interest in reducing smoking and tobacco use among minors.231  
Evidence that advertising is strongly correlated to childhood obesity is similarly available and persuasive, 
as discussed supra.   
3. Restriction no more extensive than necessary to meet the interest 
The final part of the Central Hudson test examines whether the restriction on commercial  
advertising “is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interest that supports it.”232  To withstand 
the fourth part of the test, the government must prove that the regulation is a good fit with the desired 
objective by demonstrating that less restrictive means are either unavailable, or ineffective to meet 
legislative goals.  The commercial speech restriction is vulnerable under this part of the test if the 
government could adopt alternative regulatory measures that would restrict considerably less expression 
than the commercial speech restriction at issue, but would further the underlying substantial interest just 
as well.233   
Currently, advertising to children is largely industry self-regulated.  Defenders of the current self-
regulatory scheme argue that governmental action is not needed because the industry has its own 
regulating body, CARU, which monitors commercial advertising directed at children.  However, experts 
have long noted that CARU has an extreme conflict of interest due to the nature of its funding, and is 
wholly incapable of doing the job for which it was instituted.  Therefore, the less restrictive means of 




industry self-regulation is ineffective to meet the government’s substantial interest in reducing childhood 
obesity, and more governmental restriction is needed.      
As discussed supra, CARU is industry funded.  Companies that fund its work and subscribe to its 
guidelines include some of the largest manufacturers and marketers of fast foods to children, as well as 
trade associations representing these companies.234  Given the dominant roles played by the CARU 
supporting companies and associations, it is unsurprising that CARU is essentially powerless to impose 
its guidelines, and demonstrates a conflict of interest in some cases.  For example, in the summer of 
2005, General Mills announced the launch of a national advertising campaign targeted at children that 
would tout the health benefits of eating breakfast cereal, including Trix, Cocoa Puffs, and the other sugary 
cereals that it sells.235  General Mill’s “Choose Breakfast” campaign was designed to include characters 
such as the Lucky Charms leprechaun and the Trix bunny, which would appear on the back of sugary 
cereal boxes as part of a new “fitness squad” that would tell children that breakfast can help them stay 
focused in the morning and build muscles.236  CARU endorsed the General Mills campaign, calling it 
“responsible advertising,” which “encourage[es] a behavior that is healthful,” as opposed to not eating 
breakfast at all.237  The commercials, which aired on Nickelodeon and Cartoon Network, as well as child-
oriented programs on other channels, were part of a year-long marketing campaign aimed to get children 
to eat sugary breakfast cereals.238  Thus, while General Mills was conflating the health benefits of sugar-
laden cereals with the benefits of eating more nutritious breakfast cereals, and doing “a fabulous 
marketing job of making people think that these [sugary breakfast cereals] are health food when [they] are 
cookies,”239 CARU failed to attempt to stop the marketing campaign—in fact, it actually endorsed the 
advertising as responsible.    
CARU’s process is also weakened by its invisibility.  CARU is ridiculously understaffed.   It has only 
five full-time employees to monitor a multi-billion dollar industry.240  It does not appear that CARU and its 
supporters advertise or otherwise promote awareness of its activities among consumers and other 
stakeholders, nor do they use public-service announcements or similar outlets to encourage parents and 
others to file complaints against advertisers that violate their standards.241  More than 95% of its cases 
arise from its own monitoring of print and television advertising, rather than from consumer-initiated 
investigations.  The system is therefore extremely likely to be underinclusive of violators.  Indeed, 




numerous egregious cases of advertising that violates CARU’s principles exist that have gone unnoticed 
by the review unit.242  Moreover, CARU has no enforcement powers.  In fact, CARU’s director has said, 
“[s]ome of our guidelines have no backup in law, so somebody can actually blow us off and all we do is 
publish the results and give them bad publicity….”243  Therefore, it is obvious that self-regulation of 
commercial advertising of food to children is not working.  Therefore, there is no less extensive means by 
which the government could take action to limit the advertising of junk food to children, and this part of the 
Central Hudson test is met.   
However, governmental restrictions on television advertising to children may inevitably lead to what 
scholars call “spill-over:” a regulation that limits children’s access to harmful materials will inevitably limit 
the access of adults to the material.  This is a violation of the fourth prong of the Court’s Central Hudson 
test.  In its plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,244 the Court, drawing from Virginia 
Pharmacy, as well as a footnote that appeared in Central Hudson, demanded that “special care” be 
exercised in reviewing state laws that “entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a 
nonspeech-related policy,”245 especially when the state wraps a complete “blanket ban” over the 
“dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages.”  As Justice Stevens explained, Virginia 
Pharmacy “reflected the conclusion that the same interest that supports regulation of potentially 
misleading advertising, namely the public’s interest in receiving accurate commercial information, also 
supports an interpretation of the First Amendment that provides constitutional protection for the 
dissemination of accurate and nonmisleading commercial messages.”246  Thus, the Stevens plurality 
mapped out an area of special constitutional concern:  blanket bans on accurate commercial information 
must be reviewed with “special care,” meaning that they must be subjected to a “more stringent 
constitutional review.”247   
  Relevant spillover violations have been found in the attempts to limit youth access to sexually 
indecent material on the Internet:  Both the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and the Child Online 
Protection Act (COPA) were aimed at legitimate goals, but unconstitutionally limited adult access.248  
Similarly, the most recent attempt to limit the exposure of children to tobacco advertising on billboards, at 
issue in Lorillard Tobacco Co., discussed supra, was found unconstitutional due to its spillover effect.249  




Because adults would be cut off from information about products that they may legally consume, the 
regulations were held to be violative of the First Amendment.   
Spillover problems are addressed by more closely tailoring the restrictions to the legitimate targets.250  
In Lorillard Tobacco Co., for example, the Court noted that a constitutionally-permissible statute banning 
tobacco advertisements in sight of children would have been tailored to target practices that appeal 
primarily to youth.251  Therefore, in order to avoid the unconstitutional spillover effect, regulations of 
television advertising to children should be specifically targeted to the programs directed at children and 
the hours during which children tend to watch television.  Moreover, regulations of television advertising 
could take advantage of the relevant research literature on marketing practices using visual imagery, by 
targeting the color and pictorial imagery utilized by the ads.252  For example, because the research 
literature shows that color advertisements increase attention and recall beyond black and white formats, 
and that pictures increase an ad’s ability to communicate quickly and memorably,253 government 
regulation of television advertisements of junk food could require that such commercials use only black 
and white and certain bland imagery.   By tailoring the regulations in this manner, the government could 
meet the requirements of the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.   
In the absence of Congressional re-authorization to create a rule restricting the marketing of junk food 
to children, the FTC can utilize its existing authority over deceptive and unfair advertising to restrict such 
marketing to children.  Such an action is well within the FTC’s existing authority, and is consistent with the 
Court’s Central Hudson First Amendment test for restrictions on advertising.    
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, health officials have become increasingly alarmed by the rapid increase  
in obesity among American children.  The American Academy of Pediatrics considers the childhood 
obesity epidemic to be an “unprecedented burden” on children’s health.  Moreover, because 80% of 
obese children become obese adults, the epidemic has serious consequences for the future of the 
American public health system.  Numerous studies have documented a correlation between television 
advertising and childhood obesity rates (one which goes beyond the fact that children who watch 
television are less likely to have sufficient physical activity to ward off weight gain).  Indeed, children who 
are exposed to television advertising are more likely to make unhealthy nutritional choices, and to 




influence their parents to do the same.  Currently, television advertising to children faces little 
governmental regulation and is subject almost exclusively to weak industry self-regulation (which is more 
concerned with self-preservation than self-regulation).  Therefore, the time is right for the FTC to step in to 
regulate television advertising to children, in order to confront this public health plague.  Congress should 
give the FTC the authority and adequate funding to develop and implement rules restricting the 
advertising of food to children.  However, in the absence of such rule-making authority, the FTC can 
utilize its existing authority over deceptive and unfair marketing to restrict the advertising of food to 
children.   Such governmental regulation of commercial speech is constitutional and necessary to protect 
the health of America’s children and economy.    
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